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Re: ACTION-211 Draft text on how user agents must obtain consent to turn on a DNT signal

From: Dobbs, Brooks <brooks.dobbs@kbmg.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Jun 2012 09:39:16 -0500
To: Rigo Wenning <rigo@w3.org>, Kevin Smith <kevsmith@adobe.com>
CC: "public-tracking@w3.org" <public-tracking@w3.org>, Shane Wiley <wileys@yahoo-inc.com>, Peter Cranstone <peter.cranstone@gmail.com>, Justin Brookman <justin@cdt.org>
Message-ID: <CBFF61C4.18CA%brooks.dobbs@kbmg.com>
Rigo,

> 
> trouble is that IE 10 is not non-compliant for all possible cases.
> There are tools that are non-compliant for all possible cases.
I am not sure I agree with that statement.  If IE10's compliance job is to
communicate user preference in a manner that is discernable to a server,
when does it achieve this end?  As has been pointed out, IE makes it
impossible to discern between a DNT:1 that is or is not an expressed user
preference.  

So let me amend my earlier statement, IE10 could arguably be in compliance
if a user elects DNT:0 because this is the only time when it communicates
user intent in a manner discernable to the server.

It seems to me that both well formed and acting on demonstrated intent are
what is required on both sides for compliance.

-Brooks

On 6/13/12 5:24 PM, "Rigo Wenning" <rigo@w3.org> wrote:

> Kevin, 
> 
> trouble is that IE 10 is not non-compliant for all possible cases.
> There are tools that are non-compliant for all possible cases. This
> is why I suggested to have a MUST requirement on the handling of
> exceptions in ISSUE-152. As a server, you can test that by trying to
> trigger an exception.
> 
> IE can handle exceptions and all the other fancy stuff. So as soon
> as the user has done some act of will, all IE tokens are valid and
> you still discriminate them. This is not "the token is not
> compliant" but the message is "I don't like your browser". There is
> a huge difference between both. Because it is not a response anymore
> to the user, it is a response to Microsoft. So there is a big
> industry fight going on to the detriment of the user.
> 
> Rigo
> 
> On Wednesday 13 June 2012 15:00:48 Kevin Smith wrote:
>> Rigo,
>> 
>> It is the very fact that the server cannot know whether the
>> setting was enabled by the user or the browser which makes the
>> browser non-compliant.  As such, the server communicates its
>> inability to respond appropriately to the header back to the user
>> to let them know that if they did initiate the intent, it will
>> not be acknowledged unless they use a supported compliant browser
>> to convey the intent.
>> 
>> -kevin
>> 
>> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: Rigo Wenning [mailto:rigo@w3.org]
>> Sent: Wednesday, June 13, 2012 10:56 AM
>> To: public-tracking@w3.org
>> Cc: Shane Wiley; Peter Cranstone; Justin Brookman
>> Subject: Re: ACTION-211 Draft text on how user agents must obtain
>> consent to turn on a DNT signal
>> On Wednesday 13 June 2012 07:58:02 Shane Wiley wrote:
>>> The Server doesn't need to know - I believe that's the point
>>> you're missing.  The user installed a non-compliant UA and
>>> the Server will respond as such.  The user then has multiple
>>> options to exercise their choice but continued use of that
>>> specific UA to communicate DNT is NOT one of them.
>> 
>> Shane,
>> 
>> the user can't communicate back to the server that she has now
>> looked into the preferences, made a real choice, but wants to
>> continue to use IE10. This is the big bug in the suggestion for
>> the discrimination of a user agent currently suggested by you,
>> Ian and Roy. IE10 is not uncompliant in every situation. And the
>> current suggestion can't change back to "I accept" as the user
>> has no means to communicate back "I really really mean it". You
>> just will reject all DNT traffic from IE10. This means you
>> discriminate against valid traffic without any possibility to
>> rectify.
>> 
>> And this is really something where I start to have some doubts.
>> Browser sniffing is evil. Again: Browser sniffing is evil. Why
>> don't we then start saying, we do not like traffic from AVG. We
>> believe it is not compliant etc.. Where does that discrimination
>> end? And again, the user can't revert that as it is hard coded
>> into your servers.
>> 
>> There must be another way. Lets brainstorm about it. But browser
>> sniffing is evil! The solution to ignore a signal based on some
>> (possibly spoofed) vendor string in the HTTP chatter is
>> definitely going the wrong way.
>> 
>> Rigo
> 

-- 

Brooks Dobbs, CIPP | Chief Privacy Officer | KBM Group | Part of the
Wunderman Network
(Tel) 678 580 2683 | (Mob) 678 492 1662 | kbmg.com
brooks.dobbs@kbmg.com



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Received on Thursday, 14 June 2012 13:39:47 UTC

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