Re: ACTION-211 Draft text on how user agents must obtain consent to turn on a DNT signal

Shane,

Have to agree with Rigo on this. In fact I'm going to take it one step
further (to the delight of everyone I'm sure).

What the heck has UA got to do with anything. Last time I checked the
browser sends a DNT header. That's all the server cares about. Is it
there, and what's it's value. DNT is agnostic to UA as it MUST be to
derive any value to the consumer. Browser sniffing is wicked hard and one
miss results in a bad consumer experience.

The user must be given a choice. The current mechanism is there -
Microsoft "chose" to enable it by default - but they did NOT remove the
ability to turn it off. So IMO it's valid - even though it doesn't meet
the letter of the spec correctly - it meets it in the court of public
opinion where this proposed standard will either sink or swim.

Do you want to win the battle or win the war?



Peter
___________________________________
Peter J. Cranstone
720.663.1752








On 6/13/12 10:55 AM, "Rigo Wenning" <rigo@w3.org> wrote:

>On Wednesday 13 June 2012 07:58:02 Shane Wiley wrote:
>> The Server doesn't need to know - I believe that's the point
>> you're missing.  The user installed a non-compliant UA and the
>> Server will respond as such.  The user then has multiple options
>> to exercise their choice but continued use of that specific UA to
>> communicate DNT is NOT one of them.
>
>Shane, 
>
>the user can't communicate back to the server that she has now
>looked into the preferences, made a real choice, but wants to
>continue to use IE10. This is the big bug in the suggestion for the
>discrimination of a user agent currently suggested by you, Ian and
>Roy. IE10 is not uncompliant in every situation. And the current
>suggestion can't change back to "I accept" as the user has no means
>to communicate back "I really really mean it". You just will reject
>all DNT traffic from IE10. This means you discriminate against valid
>traffic without any possibility to rectify.
>
>And this is really something where I start to have some doubts.
>Browser sniffing is evil. Again: Browser sniffing is evil. Why don't
>we then start saying, we do not like traffic from AVG. We believe it
>is not compliant etc.. Where does that discrimination end? And
>again, the user can't revert that as it is hard coded into your
>servers.
>
>There must be another way. Lets brainstorm about it. But browser
>sniffing is evil! The solution to ignore a signal based on some
>(possibly spoofed) vendor string in the HTTP chatter is definitely
>going the wrong way.
>
>Rigo
>

Received on Wednesday, 13 June 2012 19:42:35 UTC