Re: URIs

Oops - I forgot to add...

Again - in this area, I think the TMRM work Jack Park has mentioned  
may turn out to be extremely useful.  Several folks have already  
begun to look for ways to bridge that formalism with RDF.  He makes  
some mention of this in early posts and had some additional insight &  
direction to provide in his post to this thread yesterday.

Jack also reminded me of series of books on complexity in biological  
systems that are also very relevant to this discussion - and worth  
their weight in gold.  Robert Rosen's book "Life Itself: A  
Comprehensive Inquiry into the Nature, Origin, and Fabrication of  
Life (Complexity in Ecological Systems)" (http://www.amazon.com/gp/ 
product/0231075650/sr=8-1/qid=1150907430/ 
ref=sr_1_1/102-0692249-1603311?%5Fencoding=UTF8) and the follow-up -  
"Essays on Life Itself".  Jack is absolutely right - these are  
seminal books on this topic and quite exciting to read, actually.

I need to go back to my dusty copies and re-read these in the light  
of the last 5 years of work being done on formal representation of  
biomedical information.

Cheers,
Bill

On Jun 19, 2006, at 5:11 PM, Bob Futrelle wrote:

> I would suggest that both natural language *and* ontologies are views
> of (possibly shallow) underlying knowledge.  This knowledge is
> difficult to characterize.  It is also difficult to achieve agreement
> on it within or across communities.
>
> I find the following study sobering.  Don't be misled by the term
> "folk".  Today's science is tomorrow's folk science.
>
> - Bob Futrelle
> ---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
> -
>
> Abstract
> Cognitive Science: A Multidisciplinary Journal
> 2002, Vol. 26, No. 5, Pages 521-562
> (doi:10.1207/s15516709cog2605_1)
>
> The misunderstood limits of folk science: an illusion of  
> explanatory depth
>
> Leonid Rozenblit​‌ - Department of Psychology, Yale University
> Frank Keil​‌ - Department of Psychology, Yale University
>
> People feel they understand complex phenomena with far greater
> precision, coherence, and depth than they really do; they are subject
> to an illusion—an illusion of explanatory depth. The illusion is far
> stronger for explanatory knowledge than many other kinds of knowledge,
> such as that for facts, procedures or narratives. The illusion for
> explanatory knowledge is most robust where the environment supports
> real-time explanations with visible mechanisms. We demonstrate the
> illusion of depth with explanatory knowledge in Studies 1–6. Then we
> show differences in overconfidence about knowledge across different
> knowledge domains in Studies 7–10. Finally, we explore the  
> mechanisms
> behind the initial confidence and behind overconfidence in Studies 11
> and 12, and discuss the implications of our findings for the roles of
> intuitive theories in concepts and cognition. (c) 2002 Leonid
> Rozenblit. Published by Cognitive Science Society, Inc. All rights
> reserved.

Bill Bug
Senior Analyst/Ontological Engineer

Laboratory for Bioimaging  & Anatomical Informatics
www.neuroterrain.org
Department of Neurobiology & Anatomy
Drexel University College of Medicine
2900 Queen Lane
Philadelphia, PA    19129
215 991 8430 (ph)
610 457 0443 (mobile)
215 843 9367 (fax)


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Received on Wednesday, 21 June 2006 17:06:30 UTC