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Re: indicating 'private browsing mode' over the net (was Re: Super Cookies in Privacy Browsing mode)

From: Gabriel Fernandez <gbrlfrnndz@outlook.com>
Date: Thu, 29 Jan 2015 14:29:16 -0500
Message-ID: <SNT404-EAS251A832F5147BAF081E9F89CD300@phx.gbl>
CC: Mike O'Neill <michael.oneill@baycloud.com>, Wendy Seltzer <wseltzer@w3.org>, "public-privacy@w3.org" <public-privacy@w3.org>
To: David Singer <singer@apple.com>


> On Jan 29, 2015, at 1:27 PM, David Singer <singer@apple.com> wrote:
> 
> 
>> On Jan 29, 2015, at 19:09 , Mike O'Neill <michael.oneill@baycloud.com> wrote:
>> 
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>>> Interesting mix of norms and tech -- and yes, a different privacy threat
>>> model from the one many of us are accustomed to considering. Here, we're
>>> trusting the server to share our interests and want to help us enforce
>>> the contextual boundaries we choose, even if its knowledge could span
>>> those boundaries.
>>> 
>>> This model is a better match with the Web Origin security model -- where
>>> an origin site is presumed to have control of the web application
>>> security, and the end-user must choose to trust the origin (with limited
>>> user-side overrides) or not visit the site.
>>> 
>>> I wonder what sorts of feedback could help to reinforce to end-users
>>> that their trust was in fact merited.
>>> 
>>> --Wendy
>> 
>> 
>> It would have to include all the servers being accessed, third-parties also. I think David's header would be seen all of them, and it would only take one to ignore the contextual boundaries, decide to combine multiple personas with other data in a PII keyed database, then broadcast it to the world (and UA based UUIDs are far more reliably user-identifying than IP addresses which are usually ephemeral and non-unique).
> 
> True, but donĄ¯t forget weĄ¯re coming from a state where the servers donĄ¯t even know of the desire.  I donĄ¯t mind machine-based discoverability, but itĄ¯s tricky to work out how to include transparent proxies and caches in that.
> 
>> 
> 

Cookies and NAT/proxy inspection are entrusted along with explicit disclosure of user information to the server of origin, of course. But there should be a specification for http::forbidden and alternative error code interpretation so for the proxy-server connection policy makers can declare such in terms of use. 

Gabriel DB Fernandez
pgp: 9425a6af
Received on Thursday, 29 January 2015 19:29:45 UTC

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