Re: [saag] Liking Linkability

On 2012-10-19 14:43, Klaas Wierenga wrote:
> Hi,
>
> (as a side note: shouldn't this be on the privacy list rather than the saag list?)
>
> On Oct 18, 2012, at 9:30 PM, Anders Rundgren <anders.rundgren@telia.com> wrote:
>
>> On 2012-10-18 18:06, Ben Laurie wrote:
>>>> Do you have example of what you describe? By that question I mean: implicit
>>>> anonymity as a functional substrate of some realm that we experience today?
>>> That's what selective disclosure systems like U-Prove and the PRIME
>>> project are all about.
>>>
>> Which will never be of any practical use because without a reference
>> back you cannot really get anything useful done.  The search service
>> monopoly your employer (Google) runs is clearly among the largest threats
>> to privacy there is so I don't understand what you are blabbing about.
>>
>> Is this about theory versus practice :-)

> Let's refrain from ad hominem attacks in a technical discussion….


Pardon, I get a little bit bored by hearing folks from Google preach about privacy when they are sitting on one of the largest piles of personal information there is.

And U-Prove surely haven't been a success.  I expect it to fail like all other Microsoft ID-related initiatives from Passport, to InformationCards, and forward.

>
> I don't think anyone has argued that linkability is a bad thing per se, what I believe is the crux is whether the links exists -by default- (like locators for a person that can be looked up by 3d parties in DNS) rather than -by choice-. It is the difference between being listed in the phone directory versus giving someone your phone number. I think the likes of Tor are not sufficient here, if the norm is that you are linkable than someone that is using Tor is by definition suspicious…
> David Chadwick rightfully remarks that there is a balance that you need to strike based on a risk analysis, for me the question is how much of that risk analysis you want to leave to the protocol designer versus the end-user. As an end-user I like to have sufficient control over my privacy without having to understand how to do Tor.

I think that the unlinkability should be put in a wider privacy context:
- We know that cell-phone providers know not only who we speak to, but also our surfing habits, and our location.
- We also know that 0.5Bn individuals have a Facebook account.
- We also know that the healthcare community/industry is building HUGE journal systems making WikiLeaks-like attacks both possible and potentially useful.

So I honestly do not think that a globally unique (highly linkable) e-mail address is something anybody except very paranoid people should worry about.
BTW, I use Google as IdP to several other sites and I like it.

Identity theft seems to be a MUCH worse problem.

Well, IF there had been anonymous digital money that would have been great!  But it didn't work for a lot of reasons including unlinkability which opens the gates to money laundering.

Anders


>
> Klaas
>
>

Received on Friday, 19 October 2012 13:19:56 UTC