W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > public-html-media@w3.org > May 2015

Re: [EME] Secure release & segmentation (was: Secure release and persistence)

From: Mark Watson <watsonm@netflix.com>
Date: Wed, 6 May 2015 18:00:25 -0700
Message-ID: <CAEnTvdCVfFPOf11FyW1EKuEQ3d1D+5GSKjK6xQoC_NyiJU_SBQ@mail.gmail.com>
To: David Dorwin <ddorwin@google.com>
Cc: "Jerry Smith (WINDOWS)" <jdsmith@microsoft.com>, "public-html-media@w3.org" <public-html-media@w3.org>
On Wed, May 6, 2015 at 4:38 PM, David Dorwin <ddorwin@google.com> wrote:

>
> On Thu, Apr 30, 2015 at 2:59 PM, Jerry Smith (WINDOWS) <
> jdsmith@microsoft.com> wrote:
>
> There still appears to be significant concern about the feature
>> maintaining its optional status.  I’d be interested in others comments on
>> this.  My own take is that the non-real time aspect of the feature make it
>> poorly suited to binding features to its presence.
>>
>
> If I understand Jerry’s take correctly, he thinks that secure release
> without real-time enforcement is not meaningful enough to bind features
> (and thus segment) based on it. There’s only one content provider that can
> provide real world insight on this issue:
>
> Mark, does Netflix require clients to implement secure release in order to
> receive content or certain qualities of content?
>
>
>> I’ve previously said that having it supported on a subset of UAs can
>> still add value, with no feature binding involved.  Broad UA support is
>> preferable, but doesn’t seem a requirement for the feature to be justified.
>>
>
> Can you explain why secure release can still add value (without feature
> binding) if only a subset of UAs support it? If this is the only (reliable)
> mechanism a content provider supports for detecting/preventing concurrent
> license attacks, attackers would just use the other UAs. Thus, it would
> seem that without feature binding, this feature is only useful if all UAs
> support it or the content provider only provides content to UAs that
> support it. Am I missing something?
>

​Yes. Enabling a platform for service entails a complex set of risk
assessments regarding the likelihood and difficulty of various attacks, the
cost and complexity ​of the potential mitigations and the value of having
support on that platform. . Some of these factors may depend on traffic
volume. A service provider might well conclude that supporting one platform
that was missing some desired feature was an acceptable risk wheras the
risk if all platforms did not support it might not be acceptable.

​...Mark​



>
>
>>
>>
>> Jerry
>>
>>
>>
Received on Thursday, 7 May 2015 01:00:54 UTC

This archive was generated by hypermail 2.3.1 : Thursday, 7 May 2015 01:00:54 UTC