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Re: Mapping SKOS into BFO

From: Jim McCusker <james.mccusker@yale.edu>
Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2011 10:36:02 -0400
Message-ID: <BANLkTikaMzcKKpbkrt9QwqfsNFFpwic3PA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Peter Ansell <ansell.peter@gmail.com>
Cc: Simon Spero <ses@unc.edu>, public-esw-thes@w3.org
On Thu, Apr 7, 2011 at 1:19 AM, Peter Ansell <ansell.peter@gmail.com> wrote:

> Its place may be as a superclass rather than a subclass though. If you

Not necessarily. That would assert that all dependent continuents are
concepts, which is not true from the realist perspective. The concept
of mass is not the same as the quality mass. We could make a special
CMO (Conceptual Model Ontology, which is what this work is for)
Concept class, and have that be a subclass of skos:Concept and
generically dependent continuent. But that should be a last-ditch
effort if we can't come to a better agreement.

> place skos:Concept in BFO as a subclass, you want to be sure that
> every user will follow your extended contract, even if they produced
> their SKOS datasets before they knew about the contract. If
> skos:Concept is a superclass of something in BFO, then you are
> allowing for the possibility that not all skos:Concept's will follow
> the scientific realism definition of Concept.

The contract has very few obligations. There are no property
restrictions, for one, and the definition, as something that is not
temporally dependent and does not have independent physical existence
is something that seems to be inherent in the idea of what a concept
is, regardless of the more specific definitions. If a concept is also
being treated as a set theoretic class, then it is that too, but SKOS
explicitly doesn't concern itself with that.

> If ontologies are going to be useful to wide groups (even if they are
> specialised), per the goals for BFO, they probably shouldn't enforce
> things that users don't naturally enforce prior to and outside of
> their interactions with the ontology.

As I said, the only things that being a dependent continuent (or
generically dependent continuent) require is non-temporality and
non-independent existence. How are those not always true of concepts,
even if we are staying vague with the definition of concept?

Jim McCusker
Programmer Analyst
Krauthammer Lab, Pathology Informatics
Yale School of Medicine
james.mccusker@yale.edu | (203) 785-6330

PhD Student
Tetherless World Constellation
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Received on Friday, 8 April 2011 14:36:51 UTC

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