El 03/05/2009, a las 5:51, Malcolm Crompton escribió:
> Jose et al - thanks for addressing this issue.
>
> I have quite a number of comments to make so won't waste the time of  
> the
> wider group by copying them in unless you think it is worthwhile  
> bringing
> them in.
>
> I found that I could not deal with the drafting without going back  
> to the
> beginning of the section titled Identification and Authentication  
> starting
> at www.w3.org/2007/eGov/IG/Group/docs/note#idauth.
>
> The first point where I would suggest change is under the heading  
> The Myth
> versus the reality, at
> www.w3.org/2007/eGov/IG/Group/docs/note#idauth.what.myth.
>
> Right at that point, we need to have a sentence or two on why  
> globally we
> are getting IDM wrong & hence how to avoid contributing to it.  And  
> the
> error is not just that it is easier to forge on a mass scale.  It is
> massively compounded by making the value of such forgery worthwhile  
> doing.
> And this is happening because we have introduced a vast range of new
> circumstances where the claim requiring authentication is an identity
> assertion rather than some other assertion.
>
> [in the meat world, to buy a book all I have to do is produce a  
> token that
> is unlikely to have been forged (ie money) and is likely to be mine  
> to give
> (ie I have not stolen it) and combine this with a process that makes  
> it
> unlikely I will repudiate the transaction (eg snatch back the money  
> after
> the book gets in my hand).   But online, we have to produce identity  
> claims
> to do this as well.  Hence the trick will be to make any one  
> authenticated
> claim not worth stealing.  And we are just beginning to work out how  
> to do
> this at the technology layer (eg the PRIME & PrimeLife projects in  
> Europe &
> the work of many others such as Higgins & MS CardSpace).]
>
> Thus one recommendation in this work is to recommend very strongly a
> principle that parties only require identity claims to be presented &
> authenticated when no other claim will do AND that when an identity  
> claim
> does need to be presented, it is a context specific claim (eg my  
> health
> identifier is useless & not copyable in any other circumstance).
>
> At that point as well, it is vital to introduce the concept of mutual
> authentication as a matter of mutual respect and as an essential  
> security
> requirement.  It is just as important that the citizen be able to  
> see proof
> that it is dealing with a government agency in a legitimate  
> circumstance as
> it is for the government agency to be able to see proof that it is  
> dealing
> with the right citizen.  The most obvious manifestation of failing  
> to do
> this is phishing, where the individual is tricked into thinking that  
> they
> are dealing with a legitimate organisation (see the short paper at
> www.iispartners.com/downloads/user_centric_id.pdf). Once this is  
> done, there
> are a whole series of places where redrafting & re-balancing is  
> needed.  For
> example, the emphasis in the later para beginning "Personal identity
> verification is not the only aspect of identity in online  
> transactions ..."
> is all wrong because it is dealing only with the citizen identifying  
> itself
> to government, not the equally important part of government  
> recognising it
> needs to be just as careful in identifying itself to the citizen.
>
> Under the heading What Public Policy Outcomes are Related ..., at
> http://www.w3.org/2007/eGov/IG/Group/docs/note#idauth.policy, I would
> rephrase away from suggesting that identity & privacy must be  
> 'balanced'
> against each other.  That immediately implies sub optimal outcomes  
> because
> it limits thinking to trade off options.  But there are also options  
> where
> BOTH can be enhanced at once.  The example given above is one.  If  
> we can
> limit the number of circumstances when the same identity claim has  
> to be
> presented & authenticated, we are likely to have improved privacy AND
> security.
>
> Hence rather than the words "the need for authentication and  
> identity should
> be balanced with:", why not words such as "the need to ensure that
> authentication and identity are designed with privacy in mind from  
> the very
> start so that it is not compromised".
>
> Under the heading at
> http://www.w3.org/2007/eGov/IG/Group/docs/note#idauth.benefits, the  
> big
> missing drawback is the transfer of power to any trusted third party  
> that
> can decide to bring you into digital existence, wipe you out and track
> everything that you do in between (in fact, a digital god).  This is
> probably the most worrying thing about ID management where  
> government is the
> trusted third party doing this, especially when done wrongly.  The  
> Potential
> Drawbacks list does not reflect this concern.  Arguably this is  
> covered by
> the words "decreased privacy" but it doesn’t really get the message  
> across
> because most readers will read "decreased privacy" as involving  
> insufficient
> notice or too much information sharing, all of which can be  
> components of
> the larger concern but that's all.  Perhaps words along the lines of
> "perceptions or even the reality of Big Brother surveillance and  
> control".
>
> Somewhere at about this point, we also need to introduce the extreme
> importance of allowing anonymous or pseudonymous transactions wherever
> possible.  The para underneath that list can be interpreted to be  
> seeking to
> exclude this vital part of human existence.
>
> Bearing all this in mind, under the heading
> http://www.w3.org/2007/eGov/IG/Group/docs/note#idauth.how, Legal
> Dependencies cannot be limited to the considerations currently listed.
> Legal dependencies also include appropriate legal frameworks to  
> protect the
> citizen from misuse by others and misuse by government.  [Part of  
> the debate
> in the UK about the identity card there has come from the inadequate  
> legal
> protections being offered to the citizen should the card go ahead.]
>
> Under the next heading Technological Methods ..., there is no need  
> for the
> word "restrictive" because it implies a step backwards.  Rather,  
> such law
> may in fact be a step forward to ensure that government is kept in its
> place.
>
> Then we get to the Safe to Play words.
>
> Perhaps a better formulation goes along the following lines:
>
> * Fair Risk Allocation (essentially proved consumer protection so that
> citizens do not take on an undue burden of risk).
>
> * Control (essentially ensuring that citizens can be assured that
> information about them is under control and not in a weak security
> environment or will be used in a way that was not expected; if this  
> is not
> possible then the citizen will expect to be able to exert a greater  
> degree
> of control personally)
>
> * Accountability (an important way of ensuring that government does  
> in fact
> bear an appropriate burden of risk by paying for and responding to
> governance mechanisms that ensure that its operations are working as
> intended; unintended consequences are identified and addressed and the
> chances of things going wrong minimised)
>
> * Safety net (given that all human built systems fail at some time or
> another and that the citizen is likely to be the party most affected  
> & least
> able to withstand a failure, how to ensure that the citizen is well  
> looked
> after when things go wrong:  in the case of identity management how to
> ensure that a lost or compromised identity is dealt with as an  
> 'innocent
> until proven guilty' event rather than the other way round.  The way  
> in
> which an organisation, public or private sector, manages failure is  
> one of
> the most important contributors to its perceived trustworthiness.  An
> organisation that is arrogant & won't admit failure let alone  
> contribute to
> addressing its consequences will be considered vastly less  
> trustworthy than
> an organisation that acts in the opposite way.)
>
> I am sorry if this looks hastily written.  It is.  It seemed better to
> provide some thoughts quickly rather than nothing at all which was the
> alternative just at present at this end.
>
> Regards
>
> Malcolm Crompton
>
> Managing Director
> Information Integrity Solutions Pty Ltd
> ABN 78 107 611 898
>
> T:  +61 407 014 450
>
> MCrompton@iispartners.com
> www.iispartners.com
>
>
>
> 	
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Jose M. Alonso [mailto:josema@w3.org]
> Sent: Friday, May 01, 2009 9:26 PM
> To: MCrompton@iispartners.com
> Cc: 'Daniel Bennett'; 'John Sheridan'; 'eGovernment Interest Group WG'
> Subject: Re: ISSUE-17 (safetoplay): safe to play [Identification +
> Authentication]
>
> Malcolm,
>
> Daniel has added some here:
> http://www.w3.org/2007/eGov/IG/Group/docs/note#idauth.issues.citizen
>
> Is that enough to satisfy your comments? If not, could you please
> provide replacement text?
>
> We have a very tight schedule so if we don't hear any objection from
> you by May, 5th, we'll understand is fine enough and go ahead as is.
>
> Thanks much,
> Jose.
>
>
> El 17/04/2009, a las 13:54, Malcolm Crompton escribió:
>> Jose - thanks.  I will follow responses & comment on input if that
>> would be
>> helpful.
>>
>> Malcolm Crompton
>>
>> Managing Director
>> Information Integrity Solutions Pty Ltd
>> ABN 78 107 611 898
>>
>> T:  +61 407 014 450
>>
>> MCrompton@iispartners.com
>> www.iispartners.com
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: public-egov-ig-request@w3.org [mailto:public-egov-ig-request@w3.org
>> ]
>> On Behalf Of Jose M. Alonso
>> Sent: Friday, April 17, 2009 8:30 PM
>> To: Daniel Bennett; John Sheridan
>> Cc: eGovernment Interest Group WG
>> Subject: Re: ISSUE-17 (safetoplay): safe to play [Identification +
>> Authentication]
>>
>> Daniel, John,
>>
>> I raised this one on behalf of Malcolm. I attached it to Id&Auth for
>> now, although I believe it touches on other sections such as Social
>> Media.
>>
>> Please, take a look and see if/where a paragraph or two and reference
>> should be addded.
>>
>> -- Jose
>>
>>
>> El 17/04/2009, a las 12:26, eGovernment Interest Group Issue Tracker
>> escribió:
>>> ISSUE-17 (safetoplay): safe to play [Identification +  
>>> Authentication]
>>>
>>> http://www.w3.org/2007/eGov/IG/track/issues/17
>>>
>>> Raised by: Malcolm Crompton
>>> On product: Identification + Authentication
>>>
>>> The importance of 'Safe to Play' from a citizen's perspective as we
>>> get into
>>> eGov. The most relevant paper is 'Safe to Play' which is
>>> available at:
>>>
>>>
>>
> http://www.iispartners.com/downloads/2008-02Safe-to-play-white-paper-V9POST-
>> NOBELFINALVERSIONFeb08.pdf
>>>
>>> Jose is raising this one on behalf of Malcolm Crompton
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>>
>