

## EXAMPLE 5: A more complex verifiable claim

This example is from the Verifiable Claims Data Model and Representations at <https://www.w3.org/TR/verifiable-claims-data-model/>

When looking at this, the question comes to mind: What exactly is signed? A digital signature is supposed to indicate that the content hasn't changed since signed. To recreate the hash, you need to know exactly which portion of this credential is signed:

```
{
  "@context": [
    "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/security/v1"
  ],
  "id": "http://example.gov/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["Credential", "PassportCredential"],
  "name": "Passport",
  "issuer": "https://example.gov",
  "issued": "2010-01-01",
  "claim": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "name": "Alice Bobman",
    "birthDate": "1985-12-14",
    "gender": "female",
    "nationality": {
      "name": "United States"
    },
    "address": {
      "type": "PostalAddress",
      "addressStreet": "372 Sumter Lane",
      "addressLocality": "Blackrock",
      "addressRegion": "Nevada",
      "postalCode": "23784",
      "addressCountry": "US"
    },
    "passport": {
      "type": "Passport",
      "name": "United States Passport",
      "documentId": "123-45-6789",
      "issuer": "https://example.gov",
      "issued": "2010-01-07T01:02:03Z",
      "expires": "2020-01-07T01:02:03Z"
    }
  },
  "signature": {
    "type": "LinkedDataSignature2015",
    "created": "2016-06-21T03:40:19Z",
    "creator": "https://example.com/jdoe/keys/1",
    "domain": "json-ld.org",
    "nonce": "783b4dfa",
    "signatureValue":
      "Rxpj7Kb/tDbGHFAs6ddHjVLSHDiNyZxs2MPmNG8G47oS06N8i0D
      is5mUePiZII4+p/ewc0TjvH7aJxnKEePC09IrlqaHn01TfmTut2r
      vXxESJNzur0qoNq2yXl+TqUwmDXoHZF+jQ7gCsmYqTWhhsG5uf09
      oyqDMzPoCb9ibsNk="
  }
}
```

## EXAMPLE 2: A simple signed Linked Data document

This example is from the Draft Community Group Report 27 February 2018 at <https://w3c-dvcg.github.io/ld-signatures/>

Just looking at this, the same vagueness is present. However, this document is specific about how the signature hash is initially created then re-created in sections 7.1 and 7.2

```
{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
  "title": "Hello World!",
  "proof": {
    "type": "RsaSignature2018",
    "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
    "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
    "domain": "example.org",
    "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42",
    "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK...gFWFOEjXk"
  }
}
```

From section 7.1:

1. Create a copy of document, hereafter referred to as output.
  2. Generate a canonicalized document by canonicalizing document according to a [canonicalization algorithm](#) (e.g. the GCA2015 [RDF-DATASET-NORMALIZATION] algorithm).
  3. Create a value `tbv` that represents the data to be signed, and set it to the result of running the [Create Verify Hash Algorithm](#), passing the information in options.
1. Digitally sign `tbv` using the `privateKey` and the the digital signature algorithm (e.g. JSON Web Signature using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 algorithm). The resulting string is the `signatureValue`.
  2. **Add a signature node to output** containing a [linked data signature](#) using the appropriate type and `signatureValue` values as well as all of the data in the signature options (e.g. creator, created, and if given, any additional signature options such as `nonce` and `domain`).
  3. Return output as the [signed linked data document](#).

From section 7.2:

1. Get the [public key](#) by dereferencing its URL identifier in the `signature` node of the default graph of signed document. Confirm that the [linked data document](#) that describes the [public key](#) specifies its owner and that its owner's URL identifier can be dereferenced to reveal a bi-directional link back to the key. Ensure that the key's owner is a trusted entity before proceeding to the next step.
2. Let document be a copy of signed document.
3. **Remove any signature nodes from the default graph in document** and save it as signature.
4. Generate a canonicalized document by canonicalizing document according to the [canonicalization algorithm](#) (e.g. the GCA2015 [RDF-DATASET-NORMALIZATION] algorithm).
5. Create a value `tbv` that represents the data to be verified, and set it to the result of running the [Create Verify Hash Algorithm](#), passing the information in signature.
6. Pass the `signatureValue`, `tbv`, and the [public key](#) to the [signature algorithm](#) (e.g. JSON Web Signature using RSASSA-PKCS1-v1\_5 algorithm). Return the resulting boolean value.

## Proposed JSON-LD signature format

The problem with the instructions in sections 7.1 and 7.2 is that the signed content is modified by the signer. Then, the receiver needs to undo the modifications and canonicalize the content to verify the signature. In theory, this is doable as long as the instructions are very clear. However, this is ill-advised. It could create a situation where the signature is impossible to verify.

Note, that in the Linked Data Signatures 1.0, issue 6 states:

### ISSUE 6

**The signature parameters should be included as headers and values in the data to be signed.**

Given the standards referenced above, the following format is proposed for JSON-LD Signatures:

1. The signed content is the value of the "signedContent" key-value pair.
2. The proof value is in the key-value pair immediately following.
3. The signature metadata is contained within the signedContent

With this format, the signed content is NOT modified at all between the time the signature is created and the time the signature is verified.

*Originally proposed on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2018 by Kevin Poulsen*

```
{
  "@context": "?",
  "signedContent": {
    "@context": "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
    "title": "Hello World!",
    "certificateChain": {
      "signerCert": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK...gFWFOEjXk",
      "subCaCert": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK...gFWFOEjXk",
      "caCert": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK...gFWFOEjXk"
    },
    "pinned0cspRecord": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK...gFWFOEjXk",
    "proofMetadata": {
      "type": "RsaSignature2018",
      "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
      "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
      "domain": "example.org",
      "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42",
      "intent": "I take responsibility for the veracity of
        this information"
    }
  },
  "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAiOiJK...gFWFOEjXk"
}
```

Q: If a time authority is used, would the "created" value be inside or outside of the signedContent?

Note: The certificate chain and a pinned OCSF record should be provided in order to document validity at the time this JSON-LD was signed. The gray highlighted area gives an example of where that might be included within the signedContent. This doesn't apply in circumstances where there is no CA.

## EXAMPLE 4: A signature chain in a Linked Data document

Q: Why would the draft JSON-LD signatures format modify the signed content in order to verify signatures? A: To enable signature sets on the same signed data.

The example below shows a signature chain. A signature set is very similar (example 3). This example is from the Draft Community Group Report 27 February 2018 at <https://w3c-dvcg.github.io/ld-signatures/>

In order to verify multiple signatures on the same content (not chained), any existing signature metadata needs to be removed, then the relevant signature metadata needs be inserted. As bad as that is (it modifies the signed content), the alternative is to duplicate the entire signed content for each signature. That may be a more "correct" way to do it. But if efficiency is key, then a more compact way of verifying multiple signatures may be helpful.

```
{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
  "title": "Hello World!",
  "proofChain": [{
    "type": "RsaSignature2018",
    "creator": "http://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
    "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
    "domain": "example.org",
    "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42",
    "proofValue": "eyi0iJKJ0eXA...0EjgFWFXk"
  }, {
    "type": "RsaSignature2018",
    "creator": "http://bank.example.com/notary/keys/7f3j",
    "created": "2017-09-23T20:24:12Z",
    "domain": "example.org",
    "nonce": "83jj4hd62j49gk38",
    "proofValue": "eyi0iJJ0eXAK...EjXkgFWF0"
  }
]}
```

## Proposed format for signature sets

The goal of this proposed format for signature sets is to:

Allow multiple signatures on the same content with minimal modification of the content after it has been signed. This is for situations where it's impractical to duplicate the entire content for each signature.

To verify multiple signatures, the metadata for each signature would be assigned to the proofMetadata key-value pair in the signedContent. Then, a hash of the signedContent would be compared to the decrypted proofValue.

*Originally proposed on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2018 by Kevin Poulsen*

```
{
  "@context": "?",
  "signedContent": {
    "@context": "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
    "title": "Hello World!",
    "proofMetadata": {
      "type": "",
      "creator": "",
      "created": "",
      "domain": "",
      "nonce": ""
    }
  },
  "proofSet": [{
    "proofMetadata": {
      "type": "RsaSignature2018",
      "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
      "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
      "domain": "example.org",
      "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42"
    },
    "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAi0iJK...gFWF0EjXk"
  }, {
    "proofMetadata": {
      "type": "RsaSignature2018",
      "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
      "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
      "domain": "example.org",
      "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42"
    },
    "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAi0iJK...gFWF0EjXk"
  }, {
    "proofMetadata": {
      "type": "RsaSignature2018",
      "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
      "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
      "domain": "example.org",
      "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42"
    },
    "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAi0iJK...gFWF0EjXk"
  }
]}
```

Q: With this technique, would the signedContent still need to be canonicalized? No, since there is no canonicalization for JSON. Canonicalization is probably left over from signed XML formats.

## Proposed format for signature chains

Signature chains are fundamentally different from signature sets. The signatures are to be applied in a certain order. This might imply that each subsequent signer is aware of the previous signature(s).

With example 4 above, the order of the signatures can be verified by the "created" date/time, but it doesn't prove knowledge of prior signatures. The following format:

1. eliminates the need to modify signedContent to verify signatures
2. proves knowledge of prior signatures. Prior signatures are signed.

This becomes less human-readable. So, the highlighted colors were added to show how each new signature brackets the prior signedContent + signature(s).

*Originally proposed on August 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2018 by Kevin Poulsen*

```
{
  "@context": "?",
  "signedContent": {
    "@context": "?",
    "signedContent": {
      "@context": "?",
      "signedContent": {
        "@context": "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
        "title": "Hello World!",
        "proofMetadata": {
          "type": "RsaSignature2018",
          "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
          "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
          "domain": "example.org",
          "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42"
        },
        "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAi0iJK...gFWF0EjXk",
        "proofMetadata": {
          "type": "RsaSignature2018",
          "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
          "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
          "domain": "example.org",
          "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42"
        },
        "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAi0iJK...gFWF0EjXk",
        "proofMetadata": {
          "type": "RsaSignature2018",
          "creator": "https://example.com/i/pat/keys/5",
          "created": "2017-09-23T20:21:34Z",
          "domain": "example.org",
          "nonce": "2bbgh3dgjg2302d-d2b3gi423d42"
        },
        "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAi0iJK...gFWF0EjXk"
      }
    }
  },
  "proofValue": "eyJ0eXAi0iJK...gFWF0EjXk"
}
```