> How many organizers are needed for wide adoption?
Good question - define “wide adoption” ;) For registering 1000 people, you might need around 10 organisers just for registering them. Not talking about setting up the place. Which means that it’s probably easiest to co-locate these parties with existing events - concerts, conferences, courses, ...
> Monetary and non-monetary incentives for organizers? Organization of party is time and energy consuming - why would organizers do it?
Besides curiosity and fame the organisers could get a double share of tokens, but this is not defined yet.
> Corrupt organizers - who will check organizers? - other organizers? why should we trust them? Will there be a hierarchy? How transparency will be ensured? Will rules be too complex (almost replicating elections)?
Our current model asks for all organisers of a party to agree on the list of existing users. Only if all organisers sign off will the list be published. Of course with more than 5 organisers, we need some kind of threshold signatures where you accept 8 out of 10 signatures or so.
> Benefits vs costs to cheat for organizers? Can organizer "buy a house" by cheating at organizing a party?
Will depend on the value of the token. If we ask people to show up at 6 parties per year and suppose the tokens are worth a basic income, an organiser would have to cheat a lot at organising a party.
> Cost to organize Pseudonymous Party - per participant, per organizers? (I am looking for rough estimation in USD. I saw 1-8$ here https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/accountable-pseudonyms-socialnets08.pdf <https://pdos.csail.mit.edu/papers/accountable-pseudonyms-socialnets08.pdf>. 1000 people party - 1-8 thousand USD cost - this is a lot)
That’s definitively something to take care of. If tokens get real value, part of the tokens created in the party could be used to pay for the event itself. As I wrote above, for beginning, it will be easy to patch upon existing events.
> "PoPCoin value will be defined by the market" - any estimation how much market might value it and why? Also see 1st issue.
We hope that in the long run PoPCoins will give enough value for participants to have a viable basic income. But we didn’t define yet define how often participants would have to participate in a party to keep their basic income.
>
> Issues:
> local parties made by different communities/organizers >> different trustworthiness to different communities >> different value of local currencies/PoPCoins >> how to merge currencies/PoPCoins from different parties?
> "people are allowed to dress up, mask" – this opens oppotunity for corrupted/colluded organizers to produce video file with people who had stamps from another parties
> Can trade of PoPTokens be avoided? If not it makes impossible democratic voting as parties will pay for PoPTokens.
>
> Comments:
>
>> Reputation accumulation can also be sybil-attacked by people who set up a lot of accounts and the cross-vote for their accounts to be ‘good’.
>
> I disagree with this from practical perspective. If we take Twitter for example, it is easy to get a lot of fake followers, but it is hard to get a lot of real ones. It is also hard to accumulate high quality content/tweets. In my practice it is quite easy to distinguish fake vs real accounts on Twitter, with regards to avoiding trolls, spammers, propagators.
> Evenmore, PoPTokens will not work to beat trolls/propagators (BTW - is this the end goal of PoPToken?) because trolls/propagators will simply buy PoPTokens.
>
> Thanks,
> Bohdan
>