Re: speaks_for stuff in N3Logic

I'm not saying you've done anything amiss - hardly. I'm just saying
that in case this discussion escapes to contexts involving anyone who
knows about capabilities, the approach has to marketed / positioned
appropriately so as not to disgust and alienate them. I think this is
possible without compromise.

Jonathan

On Mon, Dec 21, 2009 at 7:26 PM, Dan Connolly <connolly@w3.org> wrote:
> On Mon, 2009-12-21 at 18:17 -0500, Jonathan Rees wrote:
>> I'd be careful about getting anywhere near security with this stuff,
>> since it's inherently authority-based and if the checks are done at
>> the wrong time it will suffer along the lines of Tyler Close's "ACLs
>> don't" paper.
>
> Hmm... it's what the customer asked for; i.e. Larry asked me
> to look at origin while I was at it.
>
> I agree that the origin model is pretty whacko, but it's
> what's deployed.
>
>>  I don't think that's what you have in mind, but I'd say
>> this stuff is best marketed as empirical and inherently non-secure,
>> not prescriptive.
>
> I'm not quite following you. The two examples I've written up
> are
>
>  (1) showing the reasoning in a browser when it enforces
>  the same-origin policy.
>
>  (2) showing that relying on cookies for authorization is a lose.
>
> Certainly (2) isn't an endorsement of authority-based stuff.
>
> Perhaps (1) looks a little like it, but that's not the intent;
> the intent is just to talk about the policy. I expect that
> when I get beyond same-origin and into examples of CORS
> and UM, it'll turn out that CORS works like cookies.
>
> --
> Dan Connolly, W3C http://www.w3.org/People/Connolly/
> gpg D3C2 887B 0F92 6005 C541  0875 0F91 96DE 6E52 C29E
>
>

Received on Tuesday, 22 December 2009 13:28:11 UTC