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RE: Accountability in AC4CSR

From: Close, Tyler J. <tyler.close@hp.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Feb 2008 00:06:09 +0000
To: "L. David Baron" <dbaron@dbaron.org>
CC: "public-appformats@w3.org" <public-appformats@w3.org>
Message-ID: <C7B67062D31B9E459128006BAAD0DC3D074F7CCD38@G6W0269.americas.hpqcorp.net>

Hi David,

L. David Baron wrote:
> On Wednesday 2008-02-06 22:05 +0000, Close, Tyler J. wrote:
> > One of the primary purposes of access control is correctly
> > assigning accountability for actions. I think the current AC4CSR
> > proposal creates subtle and perhaps unexpected consequences for an
> > application's ability to correctly assign accountability.
>
> To me, the most important use case for being able to do cross-site
> XMLHttpRequest is the ability to get to *public* resources.  For
> example, being able to do things like the Flickr API on the client,
> without having to trust the API enough to let it inject script into
> your page.  This is already possible with things like the basic (map
> display) part of the Google Maps API only because there aren't
> cross-site restrictions on image loading (although the Google Maps
> API doesn't actually work that way, presumably because it gives
> Google more flexibility to change the servers).  I think it's
> extremely important that we ship something that allows this (i.e.,
> sites to relax the default cross-domain restrictions for some
> resources) in Firefox 3.
>
> In what cases is accountability for actions needed for such
> fully-public resources?

It may not be, in which case the user authentication cookies are also not needed. So public resources could be safely accessed by a design that did not send user cookies with the cross-domain request. Sending the cookies creates the issue of how to handle accountability.

--Tyler
Received on Thursday, 7 February 2008 00:07:35 GMT

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