W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > ietf-tls@w3.org > January to March 1997

Shared Secret Authentication

From: David P. Jablon <dpj@world.std.com>
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 1997 18:52:07 -0500
Message-Id: <1.5.4.16.19970206235207.10cf17f6@world.std.com>
To: ietf-tls@w3.org

Earlier threads on this list seem to have focused debate on
weak methods for password/passphrase/shared-secret authentication.

Methods that are immune to unconstrained dictionary attack
have been around since 1992, from Bellovin & Merritt's EKE family
of protocols, to the SPEKE method developed by myself.
I find it curious that the debate has settled down upon
demonstrably weaker alternatives, as in the current drafts.

I would suggest that the passauth-00.txt "Addition of
Shared Key Authentication" document be modified to use
strong password authentication.  Presenting weak password
authentication as an alternative to strong public-key
methods seems sloppy.

I really prefer the combination of strong public-key AND
strong memorizable passwords, as two independent factors for
authentication, but that's probably asking for a bit much at
this point.

------------------------------------
David P. Jablon
Integrity Sciences, Inc.
Westboro, MA
Tel: +1 508 898 9024
http://world.std.com/~dpj/
E-mail: dpj@world.std.com
Received on Thursday, 6 February 1997 18:51:03 EST

This archive was generated by hypermail pre-2.1.9 : Wednesday, 24 September 2003 06:34:58 EDT