RE: Unreliable transport

> 
>From: 	timd@consensus.com[SMTP:timd@consensus.com]
>
>- UDP and other unreliable transports: I don't think support for an
>unreliable protocol is appropriate for this effort. The current
>protocols
>(SSL & PCT) both provide protection against an opponent blocking
>traffic;
>this can be detected. In SSL 3.0, truncation attacks can be detected.
>Using
>an unreliable underlying transport makes it impossible to provide
>protection against this without essentially creating a stream transport
>on
>top of it. I think the standard we create should provide a certain set
>of
>security features which are provided by all implementations of the
>standard, and that protection against these "interruption" attacks
>should
>be a part of it.
>
>However, we should think about an unreliable transport standard which
>would
>leverage its cipher negotiation and authentication off of the stream
>protocol.

This is exactly what I have in mind when I talk about "datagram
support"--not a substitute for IPSEC, but merely a defined format for
independently decryptable datagrams, so that key management can be
unified in situations where both a reliable transport and an unreliable
one are being used in parallel.

				Daniel Simon
				Cryptographer, Microsoft Corp.
				dansimon@microsoft.com


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