RE: Working Group Last Call The ORIGIN HTTP/2 Frame

I'm suggesting that you don't close ORIGIN-using connections if they appear to be proper subsets of non-ORIGIN-using connections.

-----Original Message-----
From: Martin Thomson [mailto:martin.thomson@gmail.com] 
Sent: Monday, September 25, 2017 4:27 PM
To: Mike Bishop <Michael.Bishop@microsoft.com>
Cc: Bence Béky <bnc@chromium.org>; Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>; HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>; mnot <mnot@mnot.net>; Erik Nygren <erik@nygren.org>
Subject: Re: Working Group Last Call The ORIGIN HTTP/2 Frame

On Tue, Sep 26, 2017 at 8:02 AM, Mike Bishop <Michael.Bishop@microsoft.com> wrote:
> Presumably you opened the connection because you have requests to make for the origin in SNI; send those immediately.  Of course, you might have expected to coalesce based on history/certificate, and that's reasonable to attempt.

Well, I'm mostly thinking about the time after the TLS connection is established and before you get ORIGIN.  You don't need to do any guessing or prediction for that to work.

> I think I'd mostly say that connections on which an ORIGIN frame hasn't been received aren't considered in the "proper subset" check.

Are you suggesting that you don't coalesce if you don't see ORIGIN?
Not sure that I follow.

Received on Monday, 25 September 2017 23:50:48 UTC