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Re: CT-Policy (was: Comments on draft-stark-expect-ct-00)

From: Emily Stark <estark@google.com>
Date: Wed, 23 Nov 2016 17:14:32 -0800
Message-ID: <CAPP_2SY_C3eToX0UXv2ymzaCDaEqAbSX_x-=-=8mzsZb4n4WEA@mail.gmail.com>
To: "=JeffH" <Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com>
Cc: IETF HTTP WG <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>, Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Jeff -- thanks for the comments. Do you think it would be reasonable to
reference the Chromium + Mozilla CT policies but not define a particular
policy in a normative way? I maintain that it isn't Expect-CT's place to
define a CT policy just as it isn't HSTS's place to define what goes in a
trust store, but I'm totally open to having the draft discuss some of the
factors that browsers should consider when choosing a policy.

On Wed, Nov 23, 2016 at 4:29 PM, =JeffH <Jeff.Hodges@kingsmountain.com>

> "Expect-CT" <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-stark-expect-ct> (aka "the
> I-D" in the below) uses the term "CT policy" in many places but does not
> define the meaning of the term, as noted by EKR.
> On Tuesday, November 15, 2016 at 1:53 PM EKR wrote:
> >
> > I'm arguing that we shouldn't define a header that says "you must
> > enforce CT" without defining what "enforce CT" means.
> Agreed.
> Emily Stark <estark@google.com> also wrote on Monday, November 21,
> 2016 at 3:28 PM:
> >
> > - Policy: One can draw an analogy to HSTS, where a site promises to
> > provide a certificate that is valid according to the client's
> > definition of valid, including factors that vary across clients
> > (variations in trust stores, SHA1 deprecation, etc.).
> Although I would not characterize HSTS policy in that fashion (i.e., see
> <https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6797#section-5.2>), I agree there are
> (some) variations in UAs' contextual determination of whether any error
> conditions arise during secure channel establishment.
> > In practice, I don't think CT will be more of a foot-gun than HSTS
> > (and certainly much less than HPKP) because browsers are in close
> > collaboration to work out policies that play nicely with each other.
> Hopefully that is the case.
> I note the present Chrome CT Policy is here:
> Certificate Transparency in Chrome
> <https://a77db9aa-a-7b23c8ea-s-sites.googlegroups.com/a/chro
> mium.org/dev/Home/chromium-security/root-ca-policy/
> CTPolicyMay2016edition.pdf>
> A first draft of the Mozilla CT Policy is here:
> <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1rnqYYwscAx8WhS-MCdTiNzY
> Qus9e37HuVyafQvEeNro>
> (see also: https://groups.google.com/a/chromium.org/forum/#!topic/ct-po
> licy/waQ5oqg-USg)
> And discussions of CT policy overall are occurring on: "Certificate
> Transparency Policy" <ct-policy@chromium.org>
> The I-D should reference them in some fashion. The Moz draft has CT and CT
> background info that may be useful to borrow for the I-D or explicitly
> reference.
> Hm, it seems the term "CT qualified" (or "CT-qualified" (sigh)) -- as in a
> "CT qualified certificate" -- has traction with both GOOG and Moz, perhaps
> it ought to be employed as appropriate in the I-D.
> HTH,
> =JeffH
Received on Thursday, 24 November 2016 01:15:25 UTC

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