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Re: SSL/TLS everywhere fail

From: Jacob Appelbaum <jacob@appelbaum.net>
Date: Sat, 5 Dec 2015 03:51:11 +0000
Message-ID: <CAFggDF0CzfWuufur4f8RrVYc7kxqKsCatim-Pqhg+i+1jHqQpA@mail.gmail.com>
To: Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>
Cc: Mike Belshe <mike@belshe.com>, Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>, httpbis mailing list <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
On 12/5/15, Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk> wrote:
> --------
> In message
> <CAFggDF2L1==CBMjrTxwsLYxNYaXjUReKOnqGGLc6VNokpZwNEQ@mail.gmail.com>
> , Jacob Appelbaum writes:
>>> But SSL/TLS is just about the worst encryption you can bring to
>>> that fight, because it is *so* trivial and routine to MiTM that you
>>> can find the list-price for the necessary equipment on Google.
>>This is where we diverge, I suspect. None of that equipment is going
>>to work against PayPal or Google or even Tor Project's website when a
>>user uses a modern browser as those sites are TLS with cert pinning.
> You're right.
> PayPal, Google and the Tor Project will probably just stop working
> in Kazakstan, and either they decide to follow the duly enacted
> and valid laws of that country, or they will not be doing business
> there.

If I was a betting person, I'd bet they continue to work - except Tor
Project, I expect that to be blocked if it isn't already. Here is our
user graph for the entire year of 2015 for Kazakstan:

> For Kazakstan they *might* be able to shrug, although the track-record
> indicates that the first two tend to follow local laws.
> I have no idea what the Tor project will do, but fortunately the
> human rights activists I know about has a fallback.

I suspect that they will use Tor bridges or another similar bypass
method. If they need help, we're always happy to help - please ask
them to reach out if we can help.

> But have you followed the political discourse in UK recently ?
> Will PayPal, Google and the Tor Project be able to shrug it off
> when the UK government makes a similar move ?

People related to the Tor Project have been working to submit evidence
with regard to the latest series of bills on exactly this topic. I
guess other groups will do the same.

>>While many sites can be attacked - it requires a specific on-path
>>attacker with access to specific high cost cryptographic resources.
> Dude, it's not high cost.  Kazakstan probably didn't even pay a
> million dollars for their kit.

I'm sorry if I was unclear: The high cost is a cert chain that works
on everyone without installing a root. The gear for MITM is of course
probably the cost of a few high quality tires on a tractor.

>>> Deploy *that* with good key-management tools[1] and the politicians
>>> will face the much more impalatable choice of "Block or Pass".
>>We can't choose a single tactic [...]
> That response is a little bit ironic, coming from one of the loudest
> "TLS everywhere" advocates...

Surely you're aware that I'm working on many different angles at the
same time - exactly in many of the areas that you suggest.

All the best,
Received on Saturday, 5 December 2015 03:51:41 UTC

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