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Re: http/2 and TLS security

From: Francisco Moraes <francisco.moraes@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Nov 2015 09:18:16 -0500
To: Patrick McManus <pmcmanus@mozilla.com>
Cc: HTTP Working Group <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
Message-ID: <563A13A8.5070608@gmail.com>
Hi Patrick,

On 11/3/2015 7:29 PM, Patrick McManus wrote:
> The server makes the final choice of both application layer protocol 
> and tls version (subject to intersection with what the client offers). 
> If it cannot select >= 1.2 then it must not select h2. Doing so would 
> be a 7540 violation and some clients are likely to generate 
> INADEQUATE_SECURITY. (Firefox will.) Falling back to h1 would be fine 
> assuming some version of tls is negotiated.

But during the ALPN callback, as far as I can tell, OpenSSL still has 
not selected a cipher nor protocol, so I cannot choose to ignore the 
upgrade request to h2, unless I missed something. I would have to accept 
the request and then after the initial handshake, tear it down with 
INADEQUATE_SECURITY if either a bad cipher was selected or a lower 
version of TLS was selected.
> Restricting the cipher list to the set of best practices is definitely 
> the point. If you have a h2 only server then you can just disable them 
> - just making them lowest priority generally does the trick in a 
> server that needs backwards compat with older h1 clients.
Yes, I will make a check to at least make sure some cipher that's 
acceptable to h2 is available, otherwise I will flag it is a 
configuration error. At runtime, I will have to actually check which 
cipher was selected.

Received on Wednesday, 4 November 2015 14:18:47 UTC

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