Re: Concluding discussion on #612 (9.2.2)

On Wed, Oct 8, 2014 at 10:31 PM, Greg Wilkins <gregw@intalio.com> wrote:

> This PR is a proposal for 3).   I would look at it as penalising servers
> that do
>
not accept strong ciphers rather than as penalising clients that offer h2.
>

But the problem is that those servers already exist and so the variable
behavior
is what clients do. I don't want to speak for Patrick, but I would be
surprised
if Mozilla were willing to make a change to Firefox that would cause an
extra
set of round trips for a large fraction of the Web servers in the world.



> if the client and the server disagree about which ciphers are
>> acceptable for H2 (and specifically if the server likes some cipher for
>> H2 that the client does not) then you get a successful TLS connection
>> but the H2 stack generates an error. At this point, the client could retry
>> if it wished.
>>
>
> That was my very first suggestion way way back at the start of this whole
> thread.
> It was unacceptable but I can't recall why.
>

I don't recall this discussion, but in any case your current proposal seems
less
good for the reasons I laid out.

-Ekr