- From: Mark Nottingham <mnot@mnot.net>
- Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2014 15:52:46 +1100
- To: Nicolas Mailhot <nicolas.mailhot@laposte.net>
- Cc: "William Chan (???)" <willchan@chromium.org>, Peter Lepeska <bizzbyster@gmail.com>, Frode Kileng <frodek@tele.no>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
On 12 Feb 2014, at 6:05 am, Nicolas Mailhot <nicolas.mailhot@laposte.net> wrote: > > Le Mar 11 février 2014 03:39, Mark Nottingham a écrit : >> Nicolas, >> >> Can you expand upon that? A throwaway dismissal like that doesn't really >> help. > > The integrity hash is buried in the html page (content). Therefore, when a > web client will perform a GET on one of those resources, proxies will only > see the URL and have no way to know it should be checked against > something. In the most common case, the HTML page will be transferred over TLS, so the proxy won't have an opportunity to see it anyway (unless it is doing particularly nasty things). > For the security to be effective the integrity metadata needs to be > propagated in the web client http commands. I think the security properties of that scheme are becoming well understood, and they are effective within certain bounds. They may not allow a proxy to "add value", but that isn't a necessary condition for every new addition to the Web, surely? Cheers, -- Mark Nottingham http://www.mnot.net/
Received on Wednesday, 12 February 2014 04:53:25 UTC