- From: Manu Sporny <msporny@digitalbazaar.com>
- Date: Thu, 18 Apr 2013 09:42:11 -0400
- To: Martin Thomson <martin.thomson@gmail.com>
- CC: "Manger, James H" <James.H.Manger@team.telstra.com>, Carsten Bormann <cabo@tzi.org>, Web Payments CG <public-webpayments@w3.org>, "ietf-http-wg@w3.org" <ietf-http-wg@w3.org>
On 04/17/2013 08:00 PM, Martin Thomson wrote: > Yeah, that's a pretty bad. Switching two date-formatted headers > might be a simple thing to gain advantage on. (Last-Modified and > Date, might work to poison a cache with old content if the cache > isn't rigorous about checking Date). It seems like a simple fix > would be to include the list of headers under the signature as the > first item. Carsten, James, Martin - good catch, thanks. We had assumed that the implementation included the headers names as well as the values in the data being digitally signed. As Dave Lehn pointed out, this is a work in progress, but we wanted to get something out as sooner than later. The attack is only possible if a message is passed over a non-secure channel, right? That is, the spec is clear about passing all messages over HTTPS. Granted, that's not an excuse for the approach taken and it should be fixed, but the attack is only possible if messages are sent over an insecure channel, correct? -- manu -- Manu Sporny (skype: msporny, twitter: manusporny, G+: +Manu Sporny) Founder/CEO - Digital Bazaar, Inc. blog: Meritora - Web payments commercial launch http://blog.meritora.com/launch/
Received on Thursday, 18 April 2013 13:42:49 UTC