How much information needs to be in the unprotected envelope? Because one of the benefits of transport-level security is that a snooper, for example a government tracking dissidents, knows little/nothing about my traffic aside from the routing. Not a rhetorical question. -Tim On Fri, Jul 13, 2012 at 10:37 AM, Poul-Henning Kamp <phk@phk.freebsd.dk>wrote: > In message < > CAMm+Lwgr1cnM3-iz_quKhN9N_dS1d6qdv26kSvKZ+T_Hr9L+hw@mail.gmail.com> > , Phillip Hallam-Baker writes: > > >5a) The TLS-HTTP gap > > > >Now as far as HTTP is concerned, headers have security implications > >and so HTTP is not going to be acceptably secure without either > >transport layer or packet layer security. > > I disagree. > > What HTTP lacks is a clear distinction between "envelope" and "body" > the way SMTP and NNTP have it. > > HTTP/2.0 would enable a lot more sites to run with cryptographic > security, if there were an unprotected envelope for load-balancers > to act on. > > I also think it should be possible to mix protected and unprotected > requests on the same TCP session. > > -- > Poul-Henning Kamp | UNIX since Zilog Zeus 3.20 > phk@FreeBSD.ORG | TCP/IP since RFC 956 > FreeBSD committer | BSD since 4.3-tahoe > Never attribute to malice what can adequately be explained by incompetence. > >Received on Friday, 13 July 2012 17:42:11 GMT
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