W3C home > Mailing lists > Public > ietf-http-wg-old@w3.org > January to April 1997

Re: 305 Use proxy

From: Roy T. Fielding <fielding@kiwi.ICS.UCI.EDU>
Date: Tue, 18 Mar 1997 18:54:40 -0800
To: Josh Cohen <josh@netscape.com>
Cc: http-wg@cuckoo.hpl.hp.com
Message-Id: <9703181854.aa12253@paris.ics.uci.edu>
X-Mailing-List: <http-wg@cuckoo.hpl.hp.com> archive/latest/2735
>set-proxy : proxy-url scope=scopePrefix 
>	type= once
>	| forever 
>	| hits count=hitcount
>	| lifetime=seconds
>for GET http://www.foo.com/services/index.html HTTP/1.1

Well, for starters, please use a syntax that can be unambiguously parsed.
That means enclose all URLs in "double-quotes" or <angle-brackets> if
you intend them to be used alongside parameters.  I suggest using a
syntax similar to Link in the RFC 2068 appendix, since it overcame the
same set of problems.

>example response:
>HTTP/1.1 305 Use Proxy
>set-proxy : http://proxy1.foo.com:8080/ scope=http://www.foo.com/services/
>Suggested rules:
>Origin servers may NOT send 305, only proxies may send them.

Nope.  The original intended purpose of 305 is to allow an origin server
to prevent access unless it goes through the appropriate proxy.

>The set-proxy header is HOP BY HOP, not end to end.

You mean that the 305 response is HOP by HOP -- it doesn't make any
sense to just drop the header field.

>On scope:
>  If the returned scope is 'wider' that the request minus the part
>of the path to the right of the final slash, the header should be
>rejected or the user should be queried at the least.

Hmmm, looks like a realm, smells like a realm, why not call it a realm?

>	for the above request ( http://www.foo.com/index.html )
>	 scope=http://www.foo.com/services/ VALID
>	 scope=http://www.foo.com/         INVALID
>So basically:
>for a client: ( depending on level of paranoia )
> (A)  if the scope is 'wider' than the requested URL, the user
>	is queried.
> (B) if the scope is wider than the requested URL, and the destination
>	proxy is not in the same domain, query the user

Sounds reasonable.

>Notes on discussions:
>Cases for use:
>1. An origin server wishes to redirect a client to use a proxy
>	to access its resources
>2. A proxy server wishes to redirect a client to another proxy.
>	(the client can be another proxy )


>The Current spec:
>10.3.6 305 Use Proxy
>The requested resource MUST be accessed through the proxy given by the
>Location field. The Location field gives the URL of the proxy. The
>recipient is expected to repeat the request via the proxy.
>1) scope:
>Does this apply to only this exact URL or any others

The original description only applied to the exact URL.  I agree that
a realm would be more efficient, subject to a good set of security

>2) validity time:
>Should the client use this proxy for this or these resources
>forever, or for how long, or how many transactions?

Good question.

>3) Loops / hop counts
>What happens if proxy A redirects the client to proxy B which
>redirects it back to A?

The same that happens on all auto-redirection loops.  It is actually
noted in the section on 3xx responses.

>4) is Location: header enough?
>Does the location allow enough flexibility to express some or
>all of these?

Probably not 1 and 2.  3 is not needed.

>Im impartial on the new header / extend location header issue, 
>However, the security implications make the new header a
>probable choice, IMHO.
>5) Security
>	If the scope is 'wide' ie for all HTTP transactions or even
>just for one domain, how does the client know to trust that the
>response was not from a malicious server.

That would be the new consideration if we introduced scope/realm.

>Possible solutions:
>	The redirecting host should be able to indicate a mask
>for urls which are to be redirected to this proxy.
>Naturally, this has security implications, ie an origin server
>which tells a client to redirect to an evil proxy for ALL urls.
>A safe suggestion I think it that that scope can be a prefix
>which may only affect 'less significant URLS'..
>  Client requests http://www.ups.com/services/index.html
>  Server redirects to proxy1.ups.com
>	allowed scope: http://www.ups.com/services/*
>    not allowed scope: http://www.ups.com/*
>    not allowed scope: http://www.mcom.com/*

Keep in mind that "*" is allowed in URLs.

>Validity Lifetime:
>	We couldnt come to a unanimous consenses here, except for 
>the fact that the current spec doesnt state anything about it.
>The main ideas are:
>1) use this redirection forever ( or until the client is restarted )
>2) use this redirection just once, and come back the next time
>3) use this redirection for a specified amount of time
>4) use this redirection for a specified amount of transactions
>While its hard to come up with useful examples for all the cases,
>I beleive that a format which is flexible enough to allow any of them
>to be expresses is smartest.

That would be a good idea, yes.

>While caching and proxies have been in use for a non trivial amount of time,
>complex, hierarchical cache systems are only starting to be deployed.  
>Because of this early stage, I feel that its best to keep as many
>options open as possible, and give an much flexibility to administrators
>as possible.
>	Overall, this should be a solveable problem.  Intelligent
>ICP type protocols should be able to avoid loops, but the idea
>of some sort of 'redirected via' flag/signal/indicator isnt unreasonable.

Ummm, the client can see for itself that it is looping.

>Location: header.
>	If people feel that we need to express a scope and a lifetime,
>we'll need to either extend the Location: header or create a new one.

Create a new one.  The problem with using the Location header was that
some older client might follow the HTTP rules and treat the response
as if it were a 300, which would entice it to perform the original
request on the URL in the Location header, which in this case would
be the base proxy URL.  I suggest using "Proxy", since it seems more
advisory in nature than "set-proxy".  Also, you should consider allowing
the server to send multiple fields so that the client can be given a
"choose one" option.

>Without the scope restrictions, a malicious server can simply reply
>with a 1.1 header, including a wide scope.  A 1.1 compliant proxy
>should reject or supress this header, but an existing 1.0 or older
>proxy will happily forward this header to the 1.1 client. 
>This client would have no way of knowing if the 305 came from the
>proxy or the malicious origin server.
>Unfortunately, this makes the scope restrictions necessary.  At the
>same time, it makes large scale load balancing or failover difficult,
>since the a proxy can use this response to redirect a scope wider
>than one host to another proxy.

Why not include the notion of "trusted" proxies?  It should be possible
for a user agent to collect a list of trusted proxies in much the same
way it would collect a list of trusted cookie sites, and there won't
be that many proxies for any given user agent.  The user agent could
then be set to accept direction automatically from trusted proxies,
and query for all others.

 ...Roy T. Fielding
    Department of Information & Computer Science    (fielding@ics.uci.edu)
    University of California, Irvine, CA 92697-3425    fax:+1(714)824-4056
Received on Tuesday, 18 March 1997 19:08:47 UTC

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