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Re: Signatures and Authentication information must go at end of meesage.

From: Ned Freed <NED@innosoft.com>
Date: Wed, 07 Feb 1996 17:13:42 -0800 (PST)
To: hallam@w3.org
Cc: Ian Duncan <id@cc.mcgill.ca>, hallam@w3.org, http-wg%cuckoo.hpl.hp.com@hplb.hpl.hp.com
> Another reason is that some of us have to write proofs of correctness for
> systems. I object on principle to any scheme which requires a protocol to
> needlessly incorporate a possibility of error. do the right thing and all that.

I guess you don't ever use Ethernet then because apparently you object to it on
principle. Or any transistors, for that matter. Gee, I sure would like to the
system you are using...

You live in a stochastic universe. You are dreaming if you think otherwise.

Banning probabilistic methodologies at one level of operation while depending
on them at every other is nonsensical. 

> My college tutor at Oxford would be unhappy were I to go round introducing
> unnecessary bug potential even if the probability of the bug occuring were
> marginal. Mucks up a proof of correctness no end...

Apparently your college tutor didn't do a very good job -- it seems he
forgot to introduce you to one of the most basic principles of error
analysis, which is when the demonstrable probability of one sort of
error is orders of magnitude less than the demonstrable probability
of other sorts of errors the first source can be ignored.

This is exactly the case that arises with properly implemented stochastic
boundary marker generation -- guaranteeing access to enough bits of entropy to
make the probability of collision far less than the probability of an
undetectable network error is very easy to do in practice.

Received on Wednesday, 7 February 1996 17:23:58 UTC

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