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A modest proposal

From: Jeffrey Mogul <mogul@pa.dec.com>
Date: Thu, 17 Aug 95 12:10:58 MDT
Message-Id: <9508171910.AA03141@acetes.pa.dec.com>
To: http-wg%cuckoo.hpl.hp.com@hplb.hpl.hp.com
There has been a lot of somewhat repetitive debate on this mailing
list over the last few days.  I suspect that some of the confusion
stems from a lack of a shared set of goals and principles.  Maybe
we should settle on those first, before trying to design or tweak
mechanisms to implement caching?

Hence this message.  I'm going to pretend that we are designing
a new protocol, not changing an existing one, to avoid confusing
the issue with debates about broken implementations or minimal
changes.  Until we can agree on what we want the protocol to do, it's
pointless to argue over how it does it.

Let's assume that the HTTP 1.1 spec, and all subsequent ones,
explicitly state the tautology that "an implementation not conforming
to this specification does not conform to this specification."  Any
"broken" browsers, servers, or clients will simply not be able to claim
conformance to HTTP 1.1, so it is not necessary to write that spec to
allow non-conforming implementations.  At the same time, the robustness
principle applies:  we should not write a spec that leads to a
"fragile" system.

Time for a Principle:
    Principle #1 of caching:
	Caches should never introduce undetectable incorrectness.
	Correctness always takes precedence over performance.

If we can't agree on this one, then we will never reach consensus
about a caching design.

The main lesson I draw from this principle is "when in doubt,
don't cache".  This is also a version of the robustness principle.
In practical terms: a client or proxy, when trying to decide
whether or not to cache something, should do all feasible sanity checks
and not cache the object if a check fails.

The other lesson is that a server needs a foolproof mechanism to
tell the client (or proxy) not to cache an object.  This cannot
be an "optional" feature of the protocol, and it should not be
based on any client/proxy algorithm that could get a wrong answer.

So how would I design HTTP 1.1, if I were in charge?

	(1) Servers may send a header field explictly controlling
	caching.  The spec could either be simple, something like
	or a little more complicated:
		Caching-allowed: [never | always | byClient | byProxy]
	to allow for unanticipated future developments.

	(2) Clients and proxies need a foolproof way to validate cache
	entries.  "If-modified-since" seems to be of questionable
	reliability.  I suggest we use an "opaque version ID" approach:
	    o   For any cachable object, the server must generate a
	    	unique version ID.  This could be constructed from
		a timestamp, but only if the server is able to
		guarantee uniqueness of the timestamp.  A server
		without a synchronized clock may use any other scheme
		it wants, including (for example) generation of a
		random number so large that the chances of collision
		are effectively zero.
	    o	Clients and proxies caching an object must store this
		version string as part of the caching data.
	    o   To validate a cached object, a client or proxy presents
	    	its version string to the server, along with the URL.
		The server checks to see if the version string is
		still valid for the URL.
	    o   Clients and proxies must not do anything with a version
		string except store it and present it to the server for
		validity checking.

A server must have a way of deciding if the version string is valid for
a given object, but the protocol specification need not concern itself
with how this is done.  There are several ways to do this, including
using file modification dates + "epoch numbers" (every time you do
something major to the system clock, you increment the epoch number)
or adjunct databases.  If a server is unable to generate useful version
strings, it can still conform to the spec but it must specify that
the objects it returns are uncachable.

I know that some people will object that this makes life hard for
servers implemented on underpowered machines.  Tough.  It really does
not take a lot of CPU cycles or storage to get this right.   If you
can't handle the load, buy a faster server.

This approach decouples cache validity checking and expiration, and so
removes any dependency on synchronized clocks from the cache validity
protocol.  What about expiration?

The issue with expiration is how to deal with clock skew.  We can
probably learn something from the work done on clock synchronization
protocols.  Here's a first cut at a proposal:

	(3) Servers may send Expiration information for cachable
	objects.  (Expiration is not meaningful for noncachable
	objects.)  Prior to the expiration time, a client or proxy
	need not validate the cached object with the server, but
	MUST provide a means for the user to request validation.
	The Expiration header looks like this:
  	    Expiration-info: Expires-time server-current-time
	The values are:
	    o   Expires-time
		    Time at which the object expires.
	    o	server-current-time
		    Server's current idea of what time it is
	Clients and proxies would set the expiration time for a cached
	object to the Expires-time value, after correcting for the
	worst-case error.  There are a number of ways to compute this,
	but a simple technique would be something like this:
	    Tc = client's clock
	    Ts = server-current-time
	    Tr = round-trip-time measured for this request
	    Te = Expires-time
	    actual-expiration-time = Tc + (Te - Ts) - Tr/2

	Clients and proxies MUST NOT cache any object whose computed
	actual-expiration-time is highly suspect (for example, Te < Ts
	or Te < Tc, or |Tc - Ts| >> Tr.)
	A server may send an "Expires-time" of "infinity", indicating
	that the object will never change (although the user must
	still be able to request that client/proxy validate the object,
	just in case).  The "infinity" value is not subject to bogosity
Received on Thursday, 17 August 1995 12:16:55 UTC

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